Centuries-Old English Law Subverted for Israel

Six anti-Israel protestors were found guilty of criminal damage, but now face being jailed as terrorists, as before their trial a judge made a secret ‘terror’ ruling that was hidden from the jury.

PREFACE: This article relates to Palestine Action and a number of criminal acts committed by six of their members during an attack on a private Israeli owned weapons factory that supplies Israel with technology that is allegedly used to aid Israeli forces in committing war crimes and acts of genocide in Gaza. Whilst those who took part in this action are likely completely opposed to ethno-nationalism for White Britons, the irregular way in which they were tried and the fact that a crucial legal ruling before their trial was withheld from the jurors that decided their fate should be a cause for concern for all political dissidents, especially ethno-nationalists. As the most persecuted dissident group in Britain, any new abuse of the law by the establishment will undoubtedly be used against ethno-nationalists in the future.

In the early hours of August 6th 2024 six members of Palestine Action used a decommissioned, repurposed prison van as a battering ram to smash through the security shutters of the Elbit Systems compound in Filton near Bristol. Once inside, the group used sledgehammers, crowbars, and fire extinguishers filled with red paint to destroy computers, damage manufacturing equipment, and smash drones that were in various stages of completion. The raid, that lasted for approximately 20 minutes, caused an estimated £1 million in property damage.

During the raid both Elbit Systems security guards and the police intervened and attempted to apprehend the attackers, which led to physical confrontations with the members of Palestine Action who had entered the installation. During one of these confrontations, one of the Palestine Action members, Samuel Corner, struck a female police sergeant twice with a sledgehammer, fracturing her spine. Eventually, all six intruders were subdued and arrested before being taken to various police stations around the Bristol area where they were questioned for 36 hours before being re-arrested under Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 in order to allow police to extend the suspects’ interrogation.

On August 12th 2024, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charged the suspects with a range of different criminal offences. All six, Charlotte Head (29), Samuel Corner (23), Leona Kamio (30), Fatema Zainab Rajwani (21), Zoe Rogers (22) and Jordan Devlin (31), were charged with aggravated burglary, criminal damage and violent disorder. Additionally, two specific assault charges were brought against Samuel Corner for grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm without intent. It is important to note, all of the offences that the six defendants were charged with were regular offences, none of the defendants were charged with ‘terror offences’.

The six Palestine Action activists, who became known in the press as the “Filton Six”, initially went on trial on November 17th 2025 at Woolwich Crown Court in London. The trial, that spanned four months, concluded on February 4th 2026 and the outcome was not what the government, the CPS and the police had hoped for. The jury deliberated for more than 36 hours before returning verdicts that were a mix of acquittals and deadlocks (when the jury cannot come to a consensus and therefore a verdict is not given).

On the first charge of aggravated burglary, all six defendants were found not guilty. On the second charge of criminal damage the jury was deadlocked and failed to reach a decision for any of the six defendants. On the charge of violent disorder, Zoe Rogers, Jordan Devlin and Fatema Rajwani were acquitted, whilst the jury failed to reach a verdict on the charge for Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, and Leona Kamio. The jury were also deadlocked on Samuel Corner’s charges which related to the assault on a police officer who attended the scene of the raid.

This however was not the end of the case. The prosecution immediately sought a retrial for the charges on which the jury had failed to reach a verdict. The outcome of the first trial did however affect the Filton Six’s bail conditions – which had been extremely harsh. Between the time when they were charged and the date of their first trial, all six defendants had been held on remand, spending roughly 18 months in pre-trial detention at a number of high-security facilities, including HMP Belmarsh and HMP Eastwood Park. It is worth noting, that the 18-month detention far exceeded the standard UK statutory limit of just six months. This kind of extended pre-trial detention would usually be reserved for much more serious cases such as murder – where the defendant posed a either a flight risk or a serious risk of harm to the community.

Following their first trial the Filton Six’s bail conditions were reassessed. The judge who presided over the case, Mr Justice Johnson, granted five of the six (Charlotte Head, Leona Kamio, Fatema Rajwani, Zoe Rogers, and Jordan Devlin) conditional bail, whilst Samuel Corner remained on remand due to the violent nature of his outstanding charges. Despite being released on bail, the restrictions the defendants faced were again relatively harsh, as they were strictly limited to possessing and using only one electronic device with internet access. What’s more, this single internet-connected device had to be surrendered or made immediately available for inspection by police officers at any time without warning. This was despite the fact that their charges had nothing to do with online activity.

On April 13th 2026 the retrial of the Filton Six began, again this took place at Woolwich Crown Court in London under Mr Justice Johnson and the jury finally returned a verdict on May 5th 2026. This time, the defendants were likely far less happy with the outcome. Despite the fact that the CPS dropped the charges of violent disorder against all the defendants on the morning before the second jury was sworn in, after 14 hours of deliberation, jurors found four of the Filton Six guilty of criminal damage (Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, Leona Kamio, and Fatema Rajwani). What’s more, despite Samuel Corner being acquitted of grievous bodily harm with intent, he was convicted of the lesser charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm without intent. Zoe Rogers and Jordan Devlin were both found not guilty and acquitted of criminal damage, allowing them to finally walk free from court.

In the wake of these convictions Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, Leona Kamio, and Fatema Rajwani were all denied bail and were again remanded in custody, this time awaiting sentencing that will take place on June 12th 2026.

And that should be the end of this – all of the defendants beat the charges of aggravated burglary, which was the most serious offence, one that carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. They also had the charge of violent disorder dropped. Which would mean, that with the exception of Samuel Corner, most of those convicted had only been found guilty of criminal damage, which does carry a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment, but typically sentences for this offence usually range from a mere community order or a fine to around 18 months in custody. Obviously, the case of Samuel Corner was more serious, as it involved violence, but he was cleared of intent and was only found guilty on the lesser charge.

As such, the fact that the Filton Six were all remanded in custody should have most people scratching their heads – especially as they had already served 18 months on remand in high-security facilities, and Samuel Corner had spent considerably longer on remand as he had not been granted bail after the conclusion of the first trial. So why were the four members of the Filton Six who were found guilty immediately remanded in custody after only being found guilty of lesser charges? Well, this is where the case gets considerably more interesting, as after their convictions several major and unprecedented twists to their legal proceedings were revealed.

Now that the trial has been concluded and all reporting restrictions have been lifted, the press have been able to report that the Judge who presided over the two trials had made a secret ruling before the first trial that there was a “terrorist connection” to the offences. This rather important issue was not revealed to the jury in either of the trials. This effectively means that the four defendants who were found guilty can now be sentenced to longer durations in custody and be subject to lengthy restrictions when they are finally released from prison, despite not actually being charged with terror offences or being tried as terrorists.

When the four defendants are sentenced, a separate determination will now be made based on the judge’s ruling that there was a connection to terrorism. This will not only lead to a longer sentence, but it would mean the four would have to serve their entire sentence in prison, unless a parole board approved their release, which can only happen after two-thirds of their sentence has been served. This is in contrast to regular prisoners, who depending on the length of their sentence can be released after serving just 40 per cent of their allotted time. And rather obviously, as the four defendants who were convicted in this case have already served 18 months or more, if it were not for this secret terror ruling, it would have been likely that at least three of them would have walked free after sentencing due to time served.

But being found guilty of a terror offence doesn’t just mean a longer sentence. The criminal justice system also attempts to force prisoners who were found guilty of terror offences into a programme of ideological ‘deradicalisation’. For a prisoner to be released early after being found guilty of a terror offence, they must not only sit in front of a parole board that assesses the likelihood of them reoffending, but the prisoner also has to convince the parole board that they have ‘reformed’ and have rescinded their beliefs. This allows a huge degree of political bias to enter parole hearings.

What’s more, even when released from prison those found guilty of such crimes could be effectively branded as terrorists for life and placed on a watch list which would require registration with the police for a period of up to 15 years. Those saddled with these restrictions must routinely register personal details with authorities, this includes notifying the police of every new bank account, email address, phone number, electronic device, vehicle, foreign travel plan, and live-in romantic relationship. Any failure to notify the police of a change – whether that be out of choice or because of a simple mistake – carries a separate criminal penalty of up to five years in prison.

For a judge to make such a ruling and then choose to keep that crucial information hidden from a jury is scandalous; as holding back such information during a trial would obviously affect a jury’s deliberations and their decision of whether to acquit or convict. Imagine being asked to deliberate on whether someone had committed a relatively minor offence, you would probably be inclined to find that person guilty if the evidence overwhelmingly suggested that they had in fact committed the offence in question. However, imagine if you were asked to reassess this case knowing that the defendant, if convicted, would face an unduly harsh and disproportionate punishment. This new information would likely affect a jury’s decision – and if a disproportionate or unduly harsh sentence was proposed, a jury would have every right to acquit.

And this is exactly how a jury is meant to perform its function. The historical use of juries to test whether a law is just and fair, or is being applied too harshly, is known as jury equity or jury nullification. In English courts, this practice allowed juries to return a “not guilty” verdict based on their conscience, even if the defendant had technically broken the law. The English legal system has evolved over centuries, with the first recognised jury trial taking place in 1220, and the early precursor to jury trials taking place as far back as 997. Since the establishment of jury trials as a norm, a series of important precedents have been set that have allowed juries to protect the public from unfair prosecution or from unduly harsh sentences and unjust laws.

For centuries, English judges could fine, starve, or imprison jurors who refused to deliver the guilty verdict the Crown demanded. This changed entirely with what was known as Bushel’s Case which took place in 1670: Two Quaker preachers, William Penn and William Mead, were arrested and put on trial for preaching in London, which violated a law banning non-Anglican religious assemblies. The jury found the men guilty of speaking in the street, but refused to convict them of an unlawful assembly. The judge imprisoned the jurors without food or water to force a guilty verdict. Edward Bushel, one of the jurors, launched a legal challenge. The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas ruled that a judge could not punish a jury for its verdict. This established the absolute independence of the jury – meaning that once a jury says “not guilty”, no judge or government can overturn their decision, giving juries the power to shield citizens from unfair laws.

This led to the nullifying of the “Bloody Code”. During the 18th and early 19th centuries, English criminal law was known as the “Bloody Code” because over 200 offences carried a mandatory death penalty – including stealing goods worth more than 40 shillings. Juries routinely used their power to protect people from what they saw as an excessively cruel law. If a defendant clearly stole a valuable item, the jury would deliberately value the stolen item at 39 shillings under oath. This practice which was known as “pious perjury” saved hundreds of people from the gallows. It proved to Parliament that the current laws were unworkable and unpopular, eventually forcing the government to abolish the death penalty for minor property thefts.

It appears that the judge presiding over the case of the Filton Six sought to circumvent the age-old English legal tradition of jury nullification by holding back information from the jury, ensuring that the jurors did not know how severe the punishment would be if the defendants were convicted. But why would an English judge do such a thing? Well, Mr Justice Johnson’s justification for his ruling has now been made public:

“On s1(1)(b) of the TA [Terrorism Act] 2000, [the defence barrister] Rajiv Menon KC and others strongly argued that influencing government was not the purpose of the action – the purpose of the action was to damage weapons and save lives – I accept that this was one motivating factor – but that does not mean that another purpose was not to damage property to be made available to the Israeli government and thereby influence the Israeli government.”

This is an incredible quote, as it reveals that an English judge chose to circumvent English law and disregard centuries-old legal tradition, whilst at the same time gagging the press, in order to unduly punish British Citizens, not because of their transgressions against the British state, or because of the severity of their actual crimes, but because the actions of those stood in the dock may have impacted the state of Israel. But this wasn’t the only irregular ruling made by Justice Johnson that related to the Zionist state and its current actions in the Middle East.

Mr Justice Johnson’s actions went far further than the unprecedented secret terror ruling. Justice Johnson put in place a number of other pre-trial rulings that prevented the defendants from being able to defend themselves properly. Justice Johnson issued a number of other strict pre-trial rulings stating that the war in Gaza, the actions of the Israeli military, and allegations of genocide did not constitute a “lawful excuse” for criminal damage. As part of this ruling, he barred the defendants’ barristers from inviting the jury to apply the principle of jury equity that was explained earlier, or from even informing the jury that such a principle exists. Justice Johnson even went as far as to restrict the defence from introducing evidence regarding Elbit Systems’ role as a weapons developer or its connection to the Middle East conflict. When a juror asked if they could acquit because the defendants believed they were preventing genocide, Justice Johnson answered “no”.

Despite the restrictions put in place, one of the defence barristers Mr Rajiv Menon KC chose to cite the foundational elements of English legal history – specifically mentioning Bushell’s Case in the first trial. Mr Menon explained to the jurors of the absolute independence of juries to decide cases according to their convictions. Mr Menon went on to state six times that a trial judge cannot legally direct or order a jury to return a guilty verdict. As a result, Justice Johnson ruled that the effect of Mr Menon’s speech was to explicitly “invite the jury to disregard my directions” on the law. Because the jury failed to convict any of the six defendants on the primary charges in their first trial, Justice Johnson and the state prosecutors began contempt of court proceedings against Mr Menon which are believed to be the first brought against a barrister in respect of a closing speech to a jury in living memory.

Justice Johnson then placed strict reporting restrictions on the contempt proceedings – similar to the restrictions placed on the secret terror ruling – keeping the legal dispute hidden from the public while the retrial of the Filton Six took place. Justice Johnson’s aggressive legal pursuit of Mr Menon had a severe and chilling effect on the retrial of the Filton Six; it forced five of the six defendants to sack their legal teams and represent themselves as the barristers acting on their behalf faced the threat of prison or large fines for contempt of court if they mentioned jury independence.

On May 12^th 2026, the Court of Appeal threw out the case against Mr Menon ruling that Justice Johnson “had no jurisdiction” to refer the case to the High Court in the manner he did. However this did little for the Filton Six, who were left without proper legal representation during their second trial. As the defendants’ legal teams were prevented from presenting their motives and principles of conscience to the jury, the majority of the defendants opted to deliver their own closing speeches. Effectively, Justice Johnson’s ruling was an attempt to prevent the jury from hearing any criticism of Israel and Israeli military actions and it had the effect of leaving the defendants without representation.

After the conclusion of the case and the removal of reporting restrictions a press release was issued by Defend our Juries, an activist group that seeks to uphold English legal tradition and ensure juries continue to have the right to acquit based on conscience. This press release read:

“The public will be astonished to learn that in the British justice system a protester can now be convicted of criminal damage for disrupting an arms factory and then be sentenced as ‘terrorists’ without having been convicted of terror charges and with this having been kept secret from the jury.”

At the time of writing, we do not know how harsh the sentences will be for the Filton Six. It may be the case that in the end the judge does not pursue unduly harsh sentences under terror legislation, however the fact that he can, without informing the jury of this fact at the beginning of the trial is worrying enough. This could set a devastating precedent where dissidents from across the political spectrum are tried in what appear to be relatively minor and straightforward cases, only for the defendant to face a much harsher sentence and restrictions for the rest of their life once the verdict has been delivered.

What makes this worse is the fact that yet again the judge’s decision is based on his opinion, rather than any subjective fact. The option of harsher sentencing under the Terrorism Act 2000 has been made possible thanks to the judge making a decision on what he felt was a motivating factor for the defendants’ actions. In simple terms: the judge decided what the defendants were thinking and feeling at the time the offence was committed. What’s more, that same judge attempted to prevent the defendants from putting forward contradicting evidence before the court. Despite having to defend themselves, the Filton Six made the case that they were damaging the property in order to save lives. However, the judge decided that they were actually attempting to influence the Israeli government, so on that basis – the opinion of one man – sentencing can now take place under terror legislation.

This again takes the English legal system a step further away from trials based on evidence, facts and testimony, and closer to Soviet-style show trials where ideology, supposed motivations and political bias play a disproportionate role in the outcome. But politicised judges and Soviet-style courts are something we have seen before in numerous cases involving dissident right activists – but now defendants face the added frightening spectre of terror legislation being secretly invoked without the knowledge of the jury who are deliberating on the case. What’s more, a judge has attempted to set a new precedent that intends to ban defendants from speaking openly in court about their own motivations and from bringing up key facts that surround the case and place their actions in a wider context.

The Filton Six were tried and convicted by a jury strictly on standard criminal charges, however Mr Justice Johnson’s pre-trial determination legally enables the court to treat the convictions under the government’s terrorism framework. This marks an unprecedented milestone in English legal history as protesters can now face terror-based sentencing enhancements despite never being charged with or convicted of actual terrorism offences. What’s more legal counsel were barred from properly defending their clients, effectively forcing the defendants to represent themselves if they wished to bring up important points about motivation and context which sit well within the established framework of English law.

Finally, it is obviously worth noting that this landmark case and it’s irregular ruling involves punishing those who have acted against the state of Israel and Zionist interests. This is clearly part of the current political and legal shift that aims to intimidate and criminalise those who protest against Israel’s political and military actions. This ruling goes hand-in-glove with the new powers granted to the police that are aimed at curtailing the activities of groups that protest against Israel’s war crimes and represents yet another way that political activists can be harshly punished, have their sentences extended and their rights curtailed when they are finally released. This clearly is not simply intended to serve as means of punishment, but is yet another way that the British establishment hopes to scare people into silence and gag those who wish to talk about Zionist power.

POSTSCRIPT: I do not endorse the actions of the Filton Six and I am well aware that if ethno-nationalists had committed such violent acts they would have been found guilty on all charges – there would have been no second trial and no outcry from the media. This is not an endorsement of this kind of ‘protest’ (if such actions can even be classified as such), but instead a warning to all political dissidents that the English legal system is being subverted in a number of ways. Not only are moves being made to abolish jury trials, but Judges can now subvert centuries-old legal norms by hiding important facts from juries to ensure a higher chance of conviction in politically charged trials. The English legal system used to be the fairest in the world, however successive governments and generations of politically motivated judges have done everything in their power to remove all the checks, balances and protections that English law once provided.